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Background: Almost 50% of the Nepali health budget is made up of international aid. International
Non-Governmental Organizations working in the field of health are able to channel their funds directly to grass
root level. During a 2010 conference, the Secretary of Population stated that the government has full knowledge
and control over all funds and projects coming to Nepal. However, there are no documents to support this. The
study aims to assess government and partner perceptions on whether Government of Nepal currently has full
knowledge of contributions of international aid organizations and International Non-Governmental Organizations to
health in Nepal and to assess if the government is able to control all foreign contributions to fit the objectives of
Second Long Term Health Plan (1997–2017).
Methods: A qualitative study was performed along with available literature review. Judgmental and snowball
sampling led to 26 in depth interviews with key informants from the government, External Development Partners
and International Non-Governmental Organizations. Results were triangulated based on source of data.
Representatives of the Department of Health Services declined to be interviewed. Data collection was done until
researchers felt data saturation had been reached with each group of key informants.
Results: While Ministry of Health and Population leads the sector wide approach that aims to integrate all donor
and International Non-Governmental Organization contributions to health and direct them to the government’s
priority areas, questions were raised around its capacity to do so. Similarly, informants questioned the extent to
which Social Welfare Council was able to control all International Non-Governmental Organizations contributions.
Political tumult, corruption in the government, lack of human resources in the government, lack of coordination
between government bodies, convoluted bureaucracy, and unreliability of donor and International Non-
Governmental Organization contributions were identified as the main reasons for difficulties in aid integration.
Conclusions: Despite its commitment to coordinate and control development assistance to the health sector, and
its leadership position of the Sector Wide Approach, complete knowledge and effective coordination of all
international contributions remains a challenge and is hampered by issues within the government as well as
among External Development Partners and International Non-Governmental Organizations.
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After a decade long civil war (1996 to 2006) and the
abolition of monarchy, Nepal emerged as “Federal
Democratic Republic of Nepal” in 2008 [1]. The Com-
munist party of Nepal (Maoist) won the largest number
of seats in the Constituent Assembly (CA) election in
2008 and formed a coalition government which included
most of the parties in the CA [1]. For the first time in
Nepal, the 2007 Interim Constitution declared that
health is a basic human right and that the state bears re-
sponsibility for it. The Ministry of Health and Popula-
tion (MoHP) is a governing body that aims at improving
the health status of the population through “equitable
and quality” health care services [2]. The current
government led by the Maoist party is, however,
over-burdened with issues of improving security and
integrating the Maoists’ armies into the national
army and may not be able to pay adequate attention
to the health sector [3].
Jeremy Shiffman, in a 2007 article [4], conveys that to
bring about a health priority in a country, two major fac-
tors are involved: first, significant political changes such as
the introduction of democracy or decentralization that
lead to modifications in the policymaking process and sec-
ond, the priorities that are already present and will have to
be competed against for available resources. He further
states that to achieve health objectives, it is not sufficient
to have donor support, resources, and effective medical
and technical interventions. The objectives should also be
a political priority [4]. Thus, politics of a nation shape its
health objectives and is just as important as donor in-
volvement and resource disbursement.
As a developing country, Nepal is heavily reliant on
foreign aid for its development as well as for other so-
cial, economic and political initiatives. Aid agencies and
their functionaries have been widespread in Nepal’s pol-
icymaking, legislative reforms and program design and
implementation for over six decades [5,6]. A particular
domain that is intrinsically related to and influenced by
the aid regime is the country’s policy process. In the fis-
cal year 2010–2011, international aid represented 26% of
national budget and 5.8% of Nepal’s Gross Domestic
Product (GDP). The main sectors receiving external sup-
port are education, local development, roads and health.
Nepal receives official development assistance (ODA)
from over 40 donors, including 35 resident agencies.
The Ministry of Finance (MoF) is responsible for the
overall coordination of foreign aid. The Foreign Aid Co-
ordination Division of the MoF is mandated to oversee
the Government’s activities in the area of aid coordin-
ation, harmonization and alignment [7].
Foreign aid to Nepal is provided by Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
donors, International Financial Institutions (IFIs), UnitedNations agencies, global vertical funds and providers of
South-South cooperation. In fiscal year 2010–11, of the
US$ 1.08 billion donated, approximately 58% came from
multilateral donors, 36% from OECD bilateral donors
and over 6% from bilateral South-South cooperation
partners [8]. Of bilateral donors, India, China, Japan,
Germany, United States, United Kingdom, Japan and
Norway are the major ones. The largest multilateral
donors are the World Bank Group, the Asian Develop-
ment Bank, the United Nations Country Team, the
European Union and the Global Fund to fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria [8].
Bilateral and multilateral agencies disburse ODA for dis-
tinct areas including, project support, Sector Wide Ap-
proach (SWAp), program support and humanitarian
assistance. In 2010–11, they disbursed 63.1% for project
support, 21.1% for sector wide development, 12.9% for pro-
gram support and 2.9% for humanitarian assistance. How-
ever, the amount of disbursement was less than that of
commitment. In 2010–11, of all government bodies, MoHP
received aid from the highest number of development part-
ners and got the largest amount of new foreign aid commit-
ment, receiving 81 projects from 21 development partners
[7]. The primary body under MoHP responsible for estab-
lishing relationships with External Development Partners
(EDPs) and IFIs is the Department of Health Services
(DoHS), with the objective of “enhancing effectiveness and
developing health services and assist the MoHP in receiving
foreign aid by clearly identifying the area of cooperation”
[9]. Foreign contributions in the form of International
Non Governmental Organizations and Non Governmental
Organizations (I/NGOs) programs are overseen by the So-
cial Welfare Council (SWC) [10], an autonomous govern-
ment organization chaired by the minister of Women,
Children and Social Welfare Ministry, and run by a board
composed of members from several ministries including
MoHP [10]. Within the MoHP, the Policy Planning and
International Cooperation Division (PPICD) officially man-
ages cooperation with national, international, I/NGO, and
private sector stakeholders. The division falls under the
responsibility of the Chief Public Health Administrator,
who reports directly to the Secretary [11].
The MoHP of Nepal has a national plan that priori-
tizes horizontal health programs that cover the most im-
portant health needs of the Nepali people [12-14].
Contributions to the health sector come from a variety
of sources including projects funded and often operated
by international aid organizations and INGOs. While the
government needs to approve these projects to assure
that they fit the national plan,these organizations may
have their own priorities, which may not necessarily fit
within the ministry’s plans [15].
In 1953, the WHO Executive Board stated that any help
to a country’s health status should be made by programs
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dress the most pressing health issues of majority of the
population [15]. Health outcomes improve when primary
health care is fortified [16-18]. The 2005 Paris Declaration
of Aid Effectiveness places local government in the leading
seat, calling for ownership, harmonisation, alignment,
results and mutual accountability. Accra Agenda for Ac-
tion, 2008 endorsed to ‘deepen implementation’ of Paris
Declaration [19]. Evidence from other developing coun-
tries show that international funding in the field of health
may not be in the best interest of the country’s existing
health system [20-22]. Nepal government has laid out
rules ensuring that government has full knowledge and
control over all internationally funded and supported
health related projects. Several publications by the MoHP
give the impression that international donors and INGOs
working in the field of health, work in close coordination
with the ministry to fulfill its main agendas. The second
long term health plan 1997–2017 talks about establish-
ment of a coordinating body with access to information
on health expenditure of all ministries, INGOs, NGOs
and private sector [23]. It also states that all donors will be
encouraged to consider the impact that their interventions
have on areas other than the ones their programs support
[22]. However, there is no government document to verify
the extent to which this is applied.
MoHP leads the SWAp [23,24], bringing all stakeholders
together, bringing reform in systems, structures and policies
of MoHP in program financing and changes in relationship
with other stakeholders within the sector including govern-
ment agencies, multilateral and bilateral EDPs and the civil
society (I/NGOs) [25,26]. However, as almost 50% of health
spending comes from international aid, it is difficult for
government to maintain clear leadership [5,6,27]. In a 2009
report on health aid effectiveness in Nepal, the author
observes that although with SWAp, gains were made in re-
productive health service delivery and child health, these
successes cannot be attributed to international aid with cer-
tainty [27]. Another report on health aid effectiveness in
Nepal states that contribution of I/NGOs at grassroots level
is more significant than donor aid as I/NGOs are able to
channel more of their funding to that level. By not channel-
ing their funds through the government, they can avoid a
large part of transaction costs [28,29].
Under these circumstances, this study aims to explore
government and partner perceptions of the extent to
which GoN currently is aware of contributions of EDPs
and INGOs to health in Nepal and its control of foreign
contributions in order to meet the objectives of Second
Long Term Health Plan (1997–2017).
Methods
A qualitative study was performed along with available
literature review. For the qualitative study, taking indepth interviews (IDI) was the method undertaken.
Judgmental sampling followed by snowball method led
to 26 in depth interviews with key informants (KIs) from
November 2010 to September 2011. Sample size was
based on unique case selections made a priori and key
informants were added to the list later through snowball
method. Trustworthiness of KIs was insured by the fact
that the researchers asked each organization to recom-
mend people who may represent their organization’s
points of view. They were people who had worked or
were currently working with the government, EDPs or
major INGOs for a minimum of five years and were
involved in coordination efforts between the government
and EDPs or INGOs. Formal and informal talks, tele-
phone conversations, and office visits were made to
track key informants’ opinions and experiences. All four
researchers were mandatorily present at the main IDIs
with each KI. Membership checking for qualitative data
was done to increase validity of the data. The interview
notes were reviewed with the key informant present who
was asked if that was what he/she meant to convey.
Key government informants included the officials from
MoF, Ministry of Women, Children and Social Welfare
(MoWCSW), MoHP, National Planning Commission
(NPC), and SWC. Key informants from EDPs were
representatives from United Nations Population Fund
(UNFPA), UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), World Health
Organization (WHO), United States Agency for Inter-
national Development (USAID), Deutsche Gesellschaft
für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GiZ), Swiss Agency
for Development and Cooperation (SDC), Kreditanstalt
für Wiederaufbau (KfW), Australian Agency for Inter-
national Development (AusAID), United Kingdom’s
Department For International Development (DFID), and
World Bank [28]. INGO key informants belonged to
Action Aid, International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), United Mission to Nepal (UMN), Merlin,
Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA),
Family Planning Association of Nepal (FPAN) and
Family Health International (FHI).
One government organization that could not be repre-
sented in our study is the Department of Health Services.
Although the research team repeatedly approached this
organization from November 2010 to September 2011 and
requested interviews with KIs belonging to it, appointment
was not granted. Table 1 enlists all the organizations from
which KIs were interviewed and also indicates the number
of interviews from each organization.
Notes from the IDI interviews were transcribed imme-
diately by the study team and stored in the Principal
investigator’s laptop. The taped conversation and its
transcript were used to verify the transcription later.
This data was analyzed using pile sorting and content
analyzing. Data collection was done until the researchers
Table 1 key informants, organizations and number of interviews from each organization
SN Organization Number of interviews
Governmental organizations
1. Ministry of Health and Population 5
2. Ministry of Finance 1
3. National Planning Commission 1
4. Ministry of Women, Children and Social Welfare 1
5. Government’s zonal hospitals in two rural locations 2
Total number of interviews from Governmental organizations 10

















5. Action Aid 1
6. UMN 1
Total number of interviews from INGOs 6
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group of KIs- Government, EDPs and INGOs.
The broad themes and categories for the pile sorting
were decided on by the researchers during two meetings
where they discussed their impressions from the inter-
views. The categorization of data was done such as to
understand how GoN interacts with and coordinates
work with international parties. Impressions from IDIs
indicated that the mechanisms for coordination with
EDPs were separate from, and unrelated to, mechanisms
for coordination with INGOs. Thus, we sought to under-
stand them separately via themes I and II. It was also
evident that compilation and integration of inputs from
EDPs and INGOs by the government largely depended
on how well government bodies were able to communi-
cate with each other. Thus, theme III was chosen for this
purpose. Theme IV was included to summarize the most
frequently cited difficulties by all three parties as there
was considerable overlap. Three items (shown in Table 2)were added to the preformed list. These additions were
made by the researchers during the pile sorting phase
after the need of adding them was seen (Table 2).
Pile sorting was done in the following way:
 Each transcript was given a unique code. The total
transcripts were divided equally among the four
researchers. Each person did pile sorting of six
transcripts, extracting points from them that fell
under the broad themes and further into categories
and subcategories.
 The transcripts were swapped among researchers
and the process repeated. Thus, one transcript was
summarized by two researchers.
 The summaries were compared by a third researcher
who checked to make sure that both earlier people
had categorized each point in the same manner. This
researcher then made final summaries of the points
that were agreed upon by both earlier researchers.
Table 2 Themes and categories used for pile sorting and data analysis
Themes Categories Sub categories
Theme I: Relationship between GoN and INGOs
A. Government Knowledge of INGOs
working in the field of health




2. Project agreement technicalities
3. Compliance of INGOs with SWC
rules*
4. Monitoring and Evaluation
by SWC
5. Competence of SWC
Theme II: Relationship between GoN and EDPs A. Government Knowledge of work
done by EDPs
B. SWAp 1. Support for SWAp*
2. GoN as leader of SWAp
3. Achievements due to
SWAp
C. Aid Flow 1. Aid flow through government
channels
2. Aid flow through non
government channels
D. Coordination Mechanisms between
GoN and EDPs
Theme III: Coordination within the GoN
Theme IV: Difficulties Encountered by Government, EDPs and INGOs
working in the Field of Health
Theme V: Remarkable observations*
*Three additional Themes and Sub-Categories were added later during the pile sorting.
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investigator and discussed with the whole group,
including the consultant biostatistician.
Our literature review drew on the peer-reviewed scien-
tific literature and relevant grey literature– reports, re-
search and analyses, government reports, and web based
materials. Initial searches used engines including
PubMed and Google Scholar, using combinations of the
search terms: ‘aid coordination’, ‘development assistance’,
‘aid’, ‘cooperation’, ‘aid effectiveness’, etc. from 2005. Our
point of departure from 2005 is to include the progress
made to fit the objectives of the Paris Declaration [27].
The study is approved by the Nepal Health Research
Council (NHRC) (Ref. No. 1381) and follows all its rules.
Results
Relationship between GoN and EDPs
The sector wide approach
Nepal’s health SWAp was started in 2004, based on the
Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action. Mem-
bers from EDPs, private sector, INGOs, NGOs withMoHP, NPC and MoF were involved right from policy
making such that they knew what they would be sup-
porting and would have a say in setting priorities. It was
decided that all stakeholders would support the Second
Long Term Health Plan (SLTHP) 1997 to 2017. The
Health Sector Strategy was prepared based on SLTHP
and the results of numerous studies that evaluated pol-
icy, service delivery, quality of services and system devel-
opment. It outlines areas that need support in terms of
complete support, technical support and parallel sup-
port. The Nepal Health Sector Program Implementation
Plan (NHSP-IP) is used as a basis for channelizing dona-
tions. It dictates all functional policies of the govern-
ment, with clearly defined goals that state the baseline
statistics and targets to be achieved in the next five years
and has a list of priorities termed, ‘essential health care
package’. However, not all EDPs have signed up to sup-
port SWAp.
The statement of intent of SWAp states that all donors
should support the GoN’s programs but they are not
obliged to join the pool fund. All grants through pool
fund are part of the government budget, making up
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rency Account (FCA) in Nepal Rashtriya Bank (National
Bank of Nepal) and spent by the GoN and EDPs in part-
nership. Reports on expenditure by the government are
submitted to all EDPs every four months. Money that is
not pooled is ‘direct fund’ and is not part of the govern-
ment’s budget. Both pool funds and direct funds are
mentioned in the red book and are to be spent accord-
ing to government rules. However, some EDPs have
agreements with the government on how to spend the
direct funds and their money is ear marked for specific
programs such that it is not under GoN control.
EDP KIs admitted that before the implementation of
SWAp in 2004, their organizations supported vertical
projects and now they support the entire health sector
via SWAp. Some KIs said that sometimes their
organization might be funding vertical programs, but
they are all programs to support SWAp. While it is not
mandatory for EDPs to pool their funds, a number of
non pooling donors have signed a letter of intent prom-
ising to eventually pool their funds. This excludes the
organizations such as the UN agencies and USAID
whose internal structure does not allow them to do so.
Some EDP KIs feel that the government is unable to
control the non pool funds as these are “not bound to
follow government rules and EDPs contract out projects
(run by these funds) to INGOs”. No INGO KI stated
that their work involved any support for SWAp. Some
did, however, state that their work is all based on NHSP-
IP and that it involved government health system
strengthening. Although donors have a say when decid-
ing on programs, government KIs said that the GoN
makes final decisions independently and also decides on
the spending, procurement and how monitoring and
evaluation will be done. The GoN does not accept pro-
grams that do not go with government policies.
A little more than half the EDP KIs felt that SWAp is
a good mechanism as, “donors and the government both
have more accountability” and SWAp, “puts the govern-
ment in the driving seat”, exemplified by a 2004 MoHP
decision that instead of creating a separate HIV pro-
gram, as suggested by an EDP, the program’s funds
should be used in a more horizontal approach. One KI
said, “The GoN has good control over the pool funds. It
sets aside more than seventy percent of the health
budget for essential health care as per NHSP”. Another
said, “The MoHP has functioned well throughout the
civil conflict and was also awarded international award
for achieving MDG goal 5 in September 2010. Control
by the GoN is seen mainly because of the powerful
understanding and coordination between it and donors”.
A few EDP KIs feel that GoN is unable to implement
programs on its own because of its shortcomings such
as lack of technical expertise and resources for the broadfield of work, a poor capacity to monitor and evaluate,
and political conflicts that weaken the system. Govern-
ment KIs agreed and said that the SWC and MoHP are
both weak and require international financial and tech-
nical support. The programs that EDPs bring in are
accepted by the government without question. One KI
said, “Theoretically MoHP is the leader but in practical-
ity EDPs are acting a lot like leaders”. Despite all this,
one EDP KI said, “SWAp seems to be working in areas
where the government is neither very strong nor very
weak, like in Nepal. If the government is strong, we
don’t need SWAp or development partners”. Similarly,
an EDP KI conveyed that the transfer of power and
intelligence from EDPs to GoN is a must and, “GoN is
in the right track”. After SWAp was implemented, the
proportion of foreign grants in the health budget has
decreased from 55% to 50% and that the IMCI program
is now entirely government driven. A government KI
enumerated two achievements after SWAp implementa-
tion: the decrease in maternal mortality rate leading to
Nepal achieving a MDG award in 2010 and the
improved health seeking behaviour of the Nepali people,
at the same time pointing out that the achievements
cannot be entirely attributed to SWAp as it would re-
quire many studies to prove that.
Aid flow
Foreign monetary aid to the health sector in Nepal
comes either in the form of grants/loans from EDPs that
have an agreement with the government or via INGO
run projects. EDPs may be bilateral or multilateral
donors. Whereas earlier all money from donors came as
grant, now only 40-50% is grant and the rest is loaned
money. EDPs give grants to INGOs as well, but this is
not seen in the red book. INGOs may or may not notify
their grants to the MoF, but they always notify to SWC.
Some EDPs give a percentage of their total grants not to
the government but directly to INGOs that bring forth
programs that fall into the sector approach as directed
by the GoN. The money going to INGOs is not part of
the government’s budget. However, INGOs’ accounting
profiles are mentioned in the annex of the budget.
The red book has all the information about all funds
from donors and also about how much grants particular
donors have given for particular government programs.
The pool fund money is part of the government budget
but direct grants are shown in a separate column. The
health ministry of Nepal Government receives grants in
four ways:
1. General Budget Support (GBS)- The money is given
to the MoF which then decides on where to spend it.
In the opinion of one government KI, this is the ideal
kind of support.
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SWAp. Four donors pool the money and the others
don’t. Most of the sector budget support money is
pooled- nearly 50%.
3. Direct earmarked money- This can either be spent
through the government or the EDP can directly
implement programs with this money.
4. Commodity grants- This is rare. Grants are not given
as money but as commodities such as medication,
vaccines, contraceptive products, etc.
Pool fund money is spent at the discretion of the GoN
after discussion with pool donors. There are no pro-
blems in auditing as one report is sufficient. One gov-
ernment KI said, “The MoHP prefers pool donation
because it gives more control to the government”. The
non- pool fund grants have to be audited separately and
this poses a problem as there are different auditing times
for GoN and various EDPs due to differences in the fis-
cal year periods. Donors that ear mark their grants first
talk to the MoHP and do their research before deciding
on what areas to fund and then come to the MoF to give
the funds. However, one government KI felt that the ear
marked money can be used for programs that are
already being implemented, leading to duplication.
Different EDPs give different percentage of their total
grants to the government: one EDP only gives the govern-
ment five percent of its total grants meant for Nepal while
another one gives 80% to the government. The rest go to
specific projects run by INGOs. When one EDP KI was
asked why their organization’s grants are not pooled, the
answer was that the GoN does not use the donated money
effectively. Another KI argued, “I don’t think that the use
of grants would be more effective if donors didn’t go
through the government. Without supporting the system,
there is no sustainable support to the country”.
At the local level, the district level government bodies
have some budget allocated by the GoN and additionally
have their own sources of funds. Sometimes, centrally
allocated budgets for some health programs may be
directed towards particular districts only. One EDP
organization gives one third of its grants to the district
development fund and the rest to the central govern-
ment. After the ‘local safe governance act’ was estab-
lished in 1991 by the ministry of local development,
local bodies have become self governing and the grants
that go to them do not have to be notified to the central
government. When asked why this EDP does not give
grants to the central government, the KI replied that the
government is not transparent and resources given to
the central government are not channelled out to the
local bodies in a timely manner.
Similarly, another EDP implements projects at the dis-
trict level and does not contribute at all to the red book.The KI from this EDP feels that when giving money at
the central level, it first has to go to the DHO, then to
the local level government employee who ultimately tells
a volunteer what to do and the volunteer does it for free.
The money is used up from the central level down to
the local level for works such as trainings, training of
trainers (ToT) and master ToTs. Thus, this EDP prefers
to go directly to the local level and invest there. The UN
agencies and one other EDP provide technical support
and rarely grant money.
Coordination mechanisms
One government KI summarized the GoN-EDP coordin-
ation by saying, “EDP is in good relation with the GoN”.
Government and EDP KIs said that coordination starts
at the policy making level. EDPs were involved from the
early stages of formulation of NHSP I and II, such that
they would know what they would be supporting and
have a say in setting priorities. All government programs
are implemented in collaboration with EDPs, INGOs
and NGOs. Similarly, donors who give money for par-
ticular programs first consult with the government and
then decide on what to support. For example, when it
came to promoting home deliveries by SBAs, donors
argued that this would be counterproductive because the
international community supports hospital deliveries.
The MoHP had to explain that for people in remote,
rural areas where accessibility and cultural beliefs pose
problems, the best solution is to send trained personnel
to them. Donors then decided to fund this program in-
stead of promoting hospital deliveries.
Coordination mechanisms in the Nepali health sector
are comprised of several meetings held yearly or several
times a year. Most important are the Joint Annual Re-
view or JAR meetings that bring together all stake
holders in the field of health. In the meetings, the gov-
ernment prepares about ten reports and presents on
overall management, achievements and shortcomings of
the work done in one year. GoN and EDPs evaluate the
performance and productivity of the work done in the
past year and plan future strategies. For effective coord-
ination, INGOs, the civil society and media are also
involved as a ‘check and balance’ mechanism. Each
meeting lasts for two to three days. One KI said, “JAR
meetings are good. There is bilateral discussion”. One
EDP KI opined that the JAR meetings are effective, as
both the EDPs and government sides critically analyze
the reports and although these meetings may seem ‘for-
mal and ritualistic’, they ultimately foster efficiency.
Most EDP KIs thought that JAR meetings are not effect-
ive, “It (JAR) is more of a business transaction where
people are not the centre and money is. It is ritualistic
and no decision is made properly”. Another said that the
results from the meetings are not all implemented. A
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the meeting and only complain, they fail to discuss many
important issues and there are always differences in
opinion between the government and the EDPs.
Other coordination meetings include the Joint Con-
sultative Meeting or JCM, Joint Technical Assistance Ar-
rangement or JTAA and Annual Work Plan Budgeting
Meeting (AWPB). JCM are held every three months and
achievements, problems and solutions are discussed.
JTAA is a yearly meeting and the AWPB meeting
involves the government, EDPs and civil society. The
Joint Financial Agreement (JFA) brings together EDPs
that pool their grants and those that give grants directly
to the government. It outlines exactly how many meet-
ings should be held in a year, what the agendas should
be, etc. Reporting for pool funders and non pool funders
is done in a joint manner under the JFA. All donors, ex-
cept the UN agencies, accept a single government audit
done by the office of the auditor general. This office
reports on a four monthly basis. Furthermore, govern-
ment and EDP KIs said that IHP + has helped cultivate a
deeper coordination between GoN and EDPs.
The coordination among EDPs is good, as conveyed
by most EDP KIs. The EDP forum meets as and when
needed. However, one KI said that coordination of the
EDP forum with India, China and Korea is not good as
they are not part of the forum. Another KI said, “Some-
times the government wants to play off two donors so
we try to team together and prevent this”.
In contrast to this, there were no comments by govern-
ment KIs that implied that coordination within the gov-
ernment is good, whereas five government KIs stated that
the coordination between and within government bodies
is bad. “There is absolute lack of coordination and com-
munication between ministries, among personnel of the
same ministry and among different departments. People
tend to hide information in order to implement programs
they favour,” said one government KI. The presence of
two secretaries at MoHP has posed some problems. Mis-
understandings between the two and their frequently
interchanging designations as secretary of health and sec-
retary of population causes problems to donors.
The lack of communication between SWC and MoHP
may lead to duplication of health programs. The SWC
does not work under the MoHP and KIs from MoHP in
turn feel that they do not need to know about INGOs
and NGOs working for health. The MoHP is not
informed about the evaluation of INGOs. INGO KIs told
us that a recent conflict between SWC and other minis-
tries as well as internal conflicts between government
bodies had led to massive delays in the document pro-
cessing process for INGOs. There is slow communica-
tion between ministries as well as between central and
local level government bodies.Relationship between GoN and INGOs
Government knowledge of INGOs working in the field of
health
KIs from the government all agreed that for any or-
ganization to work in the capacity of an INGO, it has to
be registered at the SWC. Thus, SWC has full know-
ledge of all registered INGOs and the work they do. This
is not true for other government organizations. The KI
from MoHP stated, “MoHP has no knowledge of how
many INGOs and NGOs are working in Nepal in the
field of health and what work they are doing”. The MoF
also only deals with donor organizations. Its reports do
not reflect on the contribution of INGOs.
Although SWC is aware of all registered INGOS, gov-
ernment and INGO KIs stated that there are organizations
that opt to “bypass the SWC” by not registering. One KI
speculated that these INGOs do not deal at all with the
government so as to avoid all the bureaucratic hurdles.
Another said, “All INGOs that have an intention of actu-
ally working and doing some good will invariably come
through the SWC. The ones that don’t are obviously
fraudulent”. The KIs told us that they did not have any
knowledge of such INGOs, although it is certain that they
exist. The proof of their existence, however, is seemingly
impossible to find. When asked if we could obtain some
information on these “illegal” INGOs, these KIs told us
that they did not know how.
Another issue that came up was of INGOs that are
working openly and are exempt from the legal obligation
of coming through SWC. All KIs from INGOs said that
they either work with governmental organizations or in
the very least inform the government about their pro-
jects in health. Of the seven INGOs we interviewed, four
said that they were registered at the SWC while three
said that they weren’t. Those that weren’t registered said
that they all had special agreements with the govern-
ment that made them exceptions to the one door policy.
One of these INGOs is working in Nepal under the
Geneva Convention and is a “neutral and independent
body” that does not collaborate with the GoN or SWC.
Another one said that their major donor has a “special
agreement” with the GoN so that it does not have to go
through the SWC, except for their Tuberculosis pro-
gram which is registered at the SWC. The last one was
conflicted upon what its status is- NGO, INGO or a hy-
brid organization and it too works in direct coordination
with the NPC.
There are other organizations that work in the field of
health but are not registered as INGOs but as compan-
ies, following an entirely different set of rules and having
no obligation of reporting their work to SWC. When
asked if SWC had any powers to take action against
INGOs that refuse to get registered, the KI informed us
that organizations legally had an option of not going
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make them comply with its rules.
Compliance of INGOs to SWC rules
Government KIs agreed that most INGOs comply with
the government’s rules, including the 80:20 rule of
money allocation, the preliminary need assessment, hav-
ing a partner NGO and getting permission from local
authorities. Before starting work in Nepal, INGOs have
to sign two agreements- general and project. The gen-
eral or blanket agreement states that no INGO can work
independently in Nepal and must work with a ‘partner
NGO’ and with SWC. Thus, there is a tripartite agree-
ment between SWC, NGO and INGO.
The signed agreement is sent to the MoWCSW. Here, a
facilitating committee reviews the papers. This committee
has 10 representatives from various ministries: Ministry of
Home Affairs, Ministry of Law and Justice, MoF, NPC,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in case of health related
INGOs, MoHP. The committee recommends whether the
INGO should be allowed to work in their specified field
and geographical area. The MoWCSW takes this into con-
sideration and either approves or disproves. The SWC
then executes its decision.
Within three months of signing of the general agree-
ment, a technical or project agreement must be signed.
Before thinking of any project, the INGO first reviews all
the plans and policies of the government like the SLTHP
and also looks at various indicators. They use data from
government surveys and also from studies done by UN
agencies. Then, based on that and the wants of the donors,
a project idea is made. They take this to the government
and ask them where this particular project may be needed.
The government suggests a district and the INGO goes
there to do a need assessment. At the local level, it meets
with the district development committee, or district health
office - governmental bodies, and asks for permission to
work in the area. The written permission is submitted
with the project proposal to the SWC. This way, duplica-
tion of work at the community level is prevented. More
often than not, the priorities of the donors are the same as
that of the government. The donors themselves also con-
sult with the government of the recipient country to make
their country strategy. When the unlikely scenario of
donor priority not matching with the government priority
occurs, the INGO convinces the donor to follow govern-
ment priority.
All approved INGOs bring their project proposals to
the SWC, which checks if all requirements are fulfilled
and then sends it to the project facilitating committee
for approval. At the facilitating committee, the members
base their judgement on whether the project fulfils any
of the current fiscal year’s plans made by the govern-
ment. The 80:20 rule is followed where 80% is thebudget allocated to the project cost and 20% is for ad-
ministrative functions of the INGO. However, a govern-
ment KI informed us that there are various loop holes to
this policy. For example, the field office fee and salaries
can be included in the project implementation budget,
although they may be administrative costs.
When asked how long this whole process takes, the KI
from SWC told us that it takes from two weeks to a max-
imum of one month and that there have been delays in
the past due to political conflict involving the facilitating
committee. In some cases, some INGOs have been
allowed to work after a “verbal agreement”- this work is
limited to the preliminary setting up of equipment and
hiring of man power. All INGO KIs agreed that the actual
time taken is about five to six months minimum. They
also admitted to starting projects without acquiring an
official approval from the SWC. One KI expressed opi-
nions on the project approval process, “When deciding on
a project, we rarely consult with SWC and we do not wait
for approval before stating a project. The approval takes at
least six months and may take up to two years. Although
according to the rules, INGOs are only supposed to im-
plement after receiving approval, this is impossible and all
INGOs know this. No donor will wait that long. Donors
would understand if there were definite rules for the time
period needed for the approval process. But, there is no
such thing. Our INGO has hired a particular person full
time to follow the project approval process at SWC. An-
other problem is, all personnel get changed when there is
change of government and they take a long time to learn
how to do their jobs”.
Monitoring and evaluation by SWC and competence of SWC
INGO KIs informed us that the monitoring and evalu-
ation done by SWC is one of the three M&E done for
INGOs. The other two are: one by the donor agency and
one by the central headquarter of the INGO. The
present SWC monitoring and evaluation system has only
been implemented since 2009. All INGOs work on a
project basis. They submit six monthly reports to the
District Project Advisory Committee (DPAC) which is
composed of members of the target population and
representatives from the district governmental office.
The DPAC gives feedback about the INGO’s work to the
Central Project Advisory Committee (CPAC). CPAC
holds annual meetings for individual INGOs. Depending
on the reports of the DPAC and CPAC, the INGO may
or may not continue its projects.
Furthermore, a final evaluation is done by a Nepali ex-
pert team that is composed of an experienced veteran of
the field, a ministry representative, a member of the
SWC and a financial expert. The team looks over the
INGO’s documents and also goes for field visits and
interviews the target population. The report submitted
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which then gives a verdict, stating if the project was ef-
fective in contributing to fulfilling national agendas or
not and makes recommendations about accepting such
projects in the future. The reports of the final evaluation
are available freely at the SWC website: www.swc.org.np.
The process outlined above is applicable to all INGOs
that are registered at the SWC. However, the KI from
SWC told us that SWC has no role in monitoring
INGOs that are not registered. Another KI stated that
the process of acquiring preliminary permission from
the DDC is an important step to prevent duplication.
The DDC coordinates with other stakeholders already
present in the area. However, their database of all the
INGOs working in the area is deficient. When projects
are implemented without prior government knowledge,
sometimes duplication of work is created, as seen in the
Village Development Committee (VDC) we visited. Des-
pite the presence of a government run health post in
this VDC most people visit a health center funded by
international donors. While it has a full time staff, a
well-stocked pharmacy and diagnostic equipment, its
government counterpart is continuously understaffed
and disorganized. Locals say they prefer the INGO
health center over the government health post. The gov-
ernment health post doctor is frequently absent for long
periods of time. The doctor was not available for inter-
view when we visited the health post as he was on leave
in Kathmandu and had been there for the past month.
The attendant at the health post explained that the doc-
tor runs a private clinic in the capital.
In line with this, we interviewed two doctors working
at the Government’s Zonal Hospitals in two different
rural locations. They both agreed that their official leaves
last longer than the sanctioned time. Most of their leaves
are to attend training programs held in the capital
funded by international organizations. For a week long
training program, they say they leave station for three
weeks or longer, depending on transportation facilities
available. The trainings are largely based on particular
skill based practices or research practices and the doc-
tors both agree that they do not gain much usable infor-
mation from them. The incentive for them is mainly a
paid trip to Kathmandu and some added money, usually
amounting to more than their monthly salary. These
incidences are issues of national interest and are fre-
quently covered by the media. When further asked
whether the doctors would work for the government or
an INGO in their locality, if given the choice, they both
said that they’d work for the INGO run service as it
would provide more facilities and vastly better salaries.
One Government KI recognized that the SWC is
under staffed and it should be decentralized to be a
more effective governing body. Currently, there is onlyone office in the capital and there are plans to create
offices outside. There are no definite fields of works such
as health, environment, education, etc. Currently, the
SWC is limited to looking after how much money an
INGO brings in, how much it spends and what its lo-
gical framework is.
INGO KIs said that the monitoring visits are requested
by the INGO itself and it does not occur often, further
stating, “They (SWC) are such a small organization and
it’s impossible for them to monitor every project by
every INGO”. However, INGO KIs observed that unlike
other areas such as education, the government is very
much involved in health related projects. It appoints
central person for different areas such as reproductive
health who makes regular visits to the project site. At
district level, the one KI informed us, the INGO works
closely with the authority there and they are constantly
monitoring it. The same KI also opined that the annual
CPAC meetings are not worthwhile and that its impact
and reason it is done are very vague.
One INGO KI said, “(We) do not go through SWC.
There is nothing to prove by going through it. SWC has
not been able to achieve anything”; that the audit done
by its donors is “far stronger” than that done by SWC
and that international humanitarian ethics are better to
follow than SWC’s rules. Two other INGO KIs felt that
the SWC M&E process is weak because of limited
human resources. One of them also said that internal
conflict and the tumultuous political situation are to
blame for SWC’s shortcomings. In the same line, one
EDP KI gave us an opinion on the SWC M&E process:
“SWC monitoring is very weak. INGOs’ and NGOs’
health project output monitoring is non-existent. There
is no mainstream database of NGO/INGO health related
project audit.” Government KI from SWC also said that
there were no project audits available to the public due
to a lack of human resources at SWC.
Difficulties encountered by government, EDPs and INGOs
working in the field of health
All KIs were asked if there were any difficulties encoun-
tered by them or their organizations when working in
the field of health in Nepal. There were 13 difficulties
delineated that are categorized and presented in Table 3.
The table also mentions numbers of KIs from the differ-
ent categories who stated the various problems. The
numbers are not meant to imply statistical significance
but are given to clarify which groups of informants tend
to hold which opinion.
Discussion
For an agriculture-based, undeveloped economy like
Nepal, progress efforts have been largely driven by for-
eign aid and INGO funded work. Nepal’s budget for
Table 3 Problems stated by the Government, EDPs and INGOs for Aid Integration (N = 26)
Difficulties GoN* EDPs* INGOs* Total* Comments
Issues related to the political context and government stability, structure and capacity
1 Political instability 1 7 2 10 The change in Nepal’s ministers occurs frequently, bringing
changes in personnel and policies in the MoHP, and influencing
the way resources are handled. Personnel who are appointed
politically often are not experienced or qualified. Political instability
also brings frequent mass strikes and lack of security.
2 Lack of human resources in the
Government
3 4 2 9 Despite the increase in budget allocation to health, increase in
funds and programs, the MoHP still follows the personnel
organogram created in 1993. The Policy, Planning and International
Cooperation Division (PPICD) director’s post stood vacant for more
than six months after resignation of the former director. The SWC
does not have separate departments for health related INGOs and
NGOs and there are too many INGOs for GoN to handle. One
government KI said, “Weak government system in our country
does not have the capacity to run enormous resources provided
by international donors.”
3 Convoluted Bureaucracy - 5 4 9 When working with government, processes are “painfully slow”.
The SWC takes several months to several years to approve projects,
a process which can only be fastened via bribes or personal
connections. The money almost finishes before the project reaches
the community due to numerous payments made to government
officials on the way.
6 There are two secretaries in Ministry of
Health and Population
1 4 - 5 The secretary of health and population’s roles are interchanged
from time to time, making donors “annoyed” and confused. Their
roles often overlap and are not clearly delineated creating “a sense
of malaise” and one KI stated, “The two secretaries compete about
going to particular meetings, for example the JAR meeting of
January 2011, creating unnecessary complications.
7 Corruption in the government - 3 2 5 Two EDP KIs said that their organizations used to give grants to
the central government but stopped doing so and instead started
giving grants directly to NGOs and INGOs.
11 Government’s system of monitoring and
evaluation isnot effective
- 3 - 3 Government’s mechanisms of monitoring like JAR are not effective,
people do not come prepared to them and a lot of issues are
missed out.
13 Government does not use donated
money effectively
- 2 - 2 In the early months of 2011, a large amount of grant money was
stopped because the government’s financial report was not
satisfying.
Issues related to intersectoral relationships and alignment within the sector
4 Lack of coordination between
government bodies
3 3 1 7 The news of new agreements between the government and EDPs
or INGOs is not communicated between government bodies
involved. There are internal conflicts between bureaucrats and
technocrats in the MoHP. Due to lack of coordination between
MoHP and SWC, there is a duplication of projects.
5 EDPs sometimes do not follow through
with commitments
3 3 6 Donors and EDPs can be “unpredictable” in that they will promise
a certain amount as grant, which is then added to the budget but
later they do not follow through. Some donors continue to
support more vertical programs that do not support SWAp,
working under agreements that were signed prior to
implementation of SWAp.
8 Absence of India and China in the EDP
forum
- 3 - 3 Both India and China contribute to Nepali health system in their
“own piece meal approach”, making hospitals, donating
ambulances, etc. without consulting any other EDPs. They don’t
participate in coordinating meetings.
10 Problems in auditing due to differences in
fiscal years among donors and Nepal
Government
1 2 - 3
Issues related to competence of government employees
9 Difficulties working with local level
government bodies
1 1 1 3 There is a lack of ownership in the district level, as government
officials expect the EDP or INGO to take full responsibility of any
projects they fund. The DDC is supposed to coordinate all
Giri et al. Globalization and Health 2013, 9:1 Page 11 of 15
http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/9/1/1
Table 3 Problems stated by the Government, EDPs and INGOs for Aid Integration (N = 26) (Continued)
stakeholders working in the community, but they don’t have
complete database of all organizations working in the area.
12 Non professionalism of government
employees
- 2 - 2 GoN personnel do not attend meetings regularly and sometimes
postpone them for personal reasons. The GoN does not take the
initiative to organize meetings and has problems with keeping
deadlines.
* These numbers are not meant to imply statistical significance but are given to clarify which groups of informants tend to hold which opinion.
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ues were provided by foreign aid and loans [30]. Over
the period of 2004 to 2009, international aid have made
up 40% to 50% of the health budget. This dependency
carries risks at a time when concern of corruption
within government of Nepal can play into the hands of
international donor fatigue [28,31,32].
All EDPs that support the Nepali health system sup-
port SWAp. They either directly fund the government’s
programs or fund INGO programs that support SWAp.
This study did not find any instances where a donor only
supported vertical programs. This is similar to the find-
ing of a 2010 systematic review of integration of targeted
health interventions into health systems. The authors
observed that no interventions were fully vertical or
horizontal and instead the picture is ‘highly heteroge-
neous’ [33].
SWAp in health was started in 2004 in Nepal. Donors
as well as recipients prefer this approach to the earlier
project approach. It is supposed to reduce duplication,
lower transaction costs, improve aid effectiveness, and
strengthen national leadership and health system [34]. In
our study, EDP KIs admitted that before 2004, vertical
projects were being run and that after SWAp, the whole
health sector is supported through a horizontal ap-
proach. Priorities are set according to national need. The
guiding document is the NHSP-IP, which was formu-
lated under the leadership of the ministry of health and
population with inputs from EDPs and the civil society.
EDP and government KIs believe that SWAp is work-
ing well in Nepal. They credit SWAp for the fact that
the health sector performed well even during the years
of internal conflict (1996–2006), and also for Nepal win-
ning the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) award
for achieving goal five in 2010 [35]. They also say that
SWAp has helped reduce duplication of work and has
fostered a better relationship between GoN and EDPs.
This is further supported by a 2009 World Bank report
that states that with SWAp, achievements were made in
Nepal in reproductive health service delivery, child
health, and family planning and health system strength-
ening [27].
On the other hand, KIs also agreed that SWAp’s actual
impact can only be assessed after about 10 years of sus-
tained implementation [34]. Similarly, credit for theachievement of MDG goal five also cannot be given to
SWAp or to any one donor as health resource tracking
in a system where donors contribute to pool funds and
give budgetary support is very difficult. When funds are
disbursed through the government, they can be allocated
freely and interchangeably to various programs making
it difficult to attribute them to specific areas [36].
The leadership role in SWAp is given to MoHP [13]. It
should make sure that any intervention in health is com-
plementary to and not a replacement of the existing sys-
tems [37]. The opinions of KIs in our study were almost
equally divided in this respect with some saying that GoN
is a good leader, some saying that it is a bad leader and
others saying that it is growing better as a leader. Evidence
from other countries show that the leadership role can be
‘problematic’ because of limited leadership capacity as
seen in Rwanda, poor relationship with the ministry of fi-
nance as seen in Mozambique, and change of senior man-
agement as in Zambia [27]. We found the MoHP’s
leadership capacity is poor due to the unnecessary pres-
ence of two secretaries, poor coordination with other
ministries and the SWC and deficient communication be-
tween personnel inside the ministry. The frequent changes
of personnel due to political instability cause problems
with inter- organizational relationships, the transference
of information and institutional memory.
Although the norm in a SWAp is for donors to pool
funds [27], in Nepal donors are not obliged to do so.
About 17% of health budget is pooled grant money.
Grants can also be given directly and not pooled. This is
termed ‘direct fund’ and does not form part of the gov-
ernment’s budget. This money is spent after a special
agreement between GoN and the donor. It is earmarked
for specific programs. One EDP KI said that their orga-
nization’s money is not pooled because the GoN does
not use the money effectively.
A 2009 article on health aid flow over the last 10 years
discusses that even though budget support and sector
support are some of the most effective forms of aid, the
proportion of aid that goes through these channels is
low [38]. We saw that EDPs give various proportions of
their grants to the government, spending the rest on
projects run by INGOs. One major donor only gives 5%
of its grants allocated for Nepal, to the government.
Money going to INGOs is not part of the government’s
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tioned in the annex of the budget. Another donor gives
one third of its grants directly to the district because it
feels that government is not transparent and money
given at the central level is not channelled out to the
local bodies in a timely manner. In the 2010 Corruption
Perception Index score by Transparency International,
Nepal is ranked 146th out of 178 countries with a score
of 2.2 [39]. On a more positive note, a 2009 study on
health aid effectiveness in Nepal states that INGOs are
able to spend more of their funds at the community
level so that their contribution at that level is more sig-
nificant than aid provided by donors [28]. However,
without proper regulation and reporting, there are
doubts as to whether INGO contribution actually helps
fulfil national goals.
Government accountability is established when there
are pressures from the civil society and service benefi-
ciaries, political pressures within itself, and an independ-
ent audit office support [36]. In Nepal, all donors except
the UN agencies accept a single government audit done
by the office of the auditor general that reports on a four
monthly basis. All donors, be it the ones that pool or
don’t pool their grants, have signed the JFA whereby
reporting for pool funders and non pool funders is done
in a joint manner and coordination meetings are held
regularly. There is also the involvement of civil society
in coordination meetings such as JAR. These facts indi-
cate that there is government accountability in Nepal.
However, in our study, most KIs said that JAR meetings
are not effective. These meetings have become ritualistic,
yield no coherent decisions and decisions that are made
are not implemented. People do not come prepared and
many issues are missed out. JAR meetings are important
tools to assess the sector’s achievements and shortcom-
ings. However, their success depends on the expertise
and experiences of the people involved [28].
For any governing body to function optimally, it must
have full knowledge and control of internal and external
factors working in its realm. Our government KIs told
us that INGOs coordinate with the SWC at the central
governmental level. Other government bodies such as
the MoHP and MoF do not get involved with issues of
INGOs and do not have any knowledge of their work.
There is no effective communication between SWC and
other government organizations. The MoHP and MoF
only deal with donor organizations and their reports do
not reflect contributions of INGOs. KIs from all three
categories stated that SWC is not competent to handle
all INGO because it is understaffed and does not have
separate departments to manage INGOs from different
sectors. From our interview with the representative from
SWC, we learned that personnel there do not know any-
thing about SWAp, and had never heard it mentionedbefore. SWC is the organization that approves or dis-
proves programs proposed by INGOs. In this context,
there is no mechanism to ensure that INGO programs
also contribute to SWAp.
Several KIs revealed that the SWC has knowledge only
of INGOs that have been registered there. The latest list
(Sept 2011) of registered INGOs available at the SWC
website shows that of the 199 INGOs registered, 67
work in the field of health [13]. There are organizations
that work in the capacity of an INGO in health but are
registered elsewhere and follow entirely different sets of
rules, having no obligation of reporting their work to
SWC. One such organization is registered as a company.
The SWC does not have any power to direct these orga-
nizations to come through the proper channel. During
the course of our study, we came across several INGOs
that are currently working in Nepal for health and are
not registered at the SWC. KIs from these organizations
explained that although they may not work with SWC,
they work with other government bodies and keep the
government informed of their work.
Both government and INGO sources agreed that
INGOs adhere to most rules set by the SWC such as the
80:20 money allocation rule, they all work with local
NGOs and community level government bodies. How-
ever, dialogues with KIs working at rural government
hospitals suggested that at the local level, INGO clinics
duplicate work done by government facilities and are
diverting skilled health workers from government jobs
to better paying INGO jobs. Trainings paid for by
donors and INGOs deprive government facilities of
health workers for long periods of time. Although all
sign the general agreement and prepare project agree-
ments, they generally do not wait for SWC approval be-
fore starting projects, as stated by KIs from government
as well as INGOs. INGO KIs explained that this was due
to long delays in the process. These projects, thus, may
not fall within government agenda. INGO KIs, however,
explained that they do a full needs-assessment before
designing any project to make sure it fits within govern-
ment plans.
When we categorically asked our KIs about any diffi-
culties they faced in their work in the health sector, most
government KIs said that everything was going accord-
ing to plan. Most difficulties were faced by EDP and
INGO KIs, as described in Table 3 and most dealt with
shortcomings on the government’s side. This included
issues of political instability, government instability,
structure, capacity and alignment within government
sectors, and competence of government employees. The
government KIs who stated problems also stated those
dealing with government short comings including polit-
ical instability, lack of human resources in government,
two secretaries in MoHP, lack of coordination between
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Conclusion
This study reflects the perceptions of key people in the
government, EDP organizations and INGOs who have
worked in the field of public health in Nepal for at least
five years. Through it, several mechanisms of the gov-
ernment’s handling of international support and the pro-
blems involved have come into light. The health system
SWAp is implemented in Nepal with the objective of
better aligning government agendas with contributions
of foreign organizations to health. By definition, it puts
the MoHP in the driving seat. Under SWAp, the MoHP
is thought to have complete knowledge of and control
over foreign contribution to health which is comprised
of funds from EDPs and international donor funded
INGO projects. Large proportions of funds from EDPs
also go to INGO run projects. I/NGOs are largely over-
seen by a separate government organization, the SWC,
which does not directly work under MoHP.
Through our study, we saw that although the system
of SWAp is in action, the MoHP has very little know-
ledge of contributions of INGOs to health. The govern-
ment body that regulates INGOs, SWC, is not aware of
what SWAp is and is unable to say whether it has a
complete database of all INGOs working in the field of
health. There are INGOs that do not get registered at
SWC and there are also those that do not wait for SWC
approval before implementing their projects. Govern-
ment knowledge of their work is deficient.
We also saw in our study that MoHP works well with
EDPs. However, EDPs do not always only give grants to
the government. They also fund INGO run projects and
not all EDPs pool their grants. The non- pool grant
money is not completely under MoHP control.
The strength of a government as the leader is reflected
in how it is run. The MoHP is still following an 18 year
old organogram of hierarchy. It also redundantly has
two secretaries who do not communicate well between
themselves. The personnel in MoHP and other minis-
tries are changed frequently, with every change in gov-
ernment causing problems in relations with EDPs and in
the smooth running of day to day work. Lastly, a govern-
ing body in control must have a good communication
and coordination system within itself. This was found to
be deficient in GoN. Not only was there little communi-
cation between ministries, the communication between
personnel from the same ministry was also poor, exem-
plified by the disconnect between the two government
organizations that are most involved in handling inter-
national contributions to health: MoHP and SWC. An-
other government organization involved extensively with
coordination with EDPs, the Department of HealthServices, declined interview and the research team was
unable to include their points of view. Nonetheless, the
health sector in Nepal did well even during the years of
conflict and majority of our KIs said that the MoHP is
doing a good job as the leader of SWAp and is also
growing stronger as a leader.
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